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Appellee, Utah State Retirement Board ("Board"), through its counsel, respectfully
submits this Brief to the Court.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)(j)(1953 as amended). This Appeal results from an Order dated May 13, 2003 by the
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, Third Judicial District Court, which granted Appellees'
Motion to Dismiss based on Appellants' failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701, which increases the retirement allowance of state
and local government retirees, constitute an illegal tax rebate in violation ofthe United States
Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judge (now Justice) Nehring's Order dismissing Appellant's claim is a question of
law, and, as such, his ruling is subject to a correctness standard. Whipple v. American Fork
Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996).
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 49 U.S. 803 (1989), isfollydeterminative
of the issue presented to this Court. Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir.
429,2000 WL 1687589 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), cert, refused, No. 010270, Va. (April 20,2001),
cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 202 (Oct. 1,2001), is the leading state court decision relating to the
issue presented and Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Ore. 1995),
provides authorative precedent from a neighboring jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richard C. Thompson and Paul C. Jensen, federal retirees, on behalf of themselves
and all other similarly situated taxpayers, filed suit against the Utah State Tax Commission
claiming discriminatory tax treatment in violation of the Davis decision.

The Tax

Commission moved to dismiss the Complaint on February 4, 2002, and also argued that the
Utah State Retirement Board should be added as a defendant. On August 23, 2002, the
District Court ordered that the Board be added as a defendant and allowed the Board "to
weigh in on the pending cross motions to dismiss" because the Board was "uniquely situated
to protect its rights and the rights of its members." Record, at 230-32. On October 9,2002,
the Board filed its own Motion to Dismiss, and subsequently the Tax Commission renewed
its Motion to Dismiss. Record, at 244-64.
On May 7,2003, the District Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Final
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Judgment against Plaintiffs was entered on May 13, 2003. Record, at 346-57. This Appeal
was filed by Plaintiffs/Appellants on June 3, 2003. Record, at 368-70.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The relevant facts are not in dispute.
PRE-DAVIS LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
1.

Even before the United States Supreme Court issued Davis, states were well aware

of the case winding its way through the appellate courts. These events caused Utah to
address the issue as early as 1988.
2.

The 1988 Utah Legislature's initial reaction to this issue was not to eliminate the tax

exemption totally for state retirees, but to remove the tax exemption only for those state and
local government employees who began participating in the retirement system after January
1, 1989. See, H.B. 221 "INCOME TAX - STATE RETIREMENT EXEMPTION, passed
February 23, 1988. The obvious net effect of this amendment was to guarantee that all state
and local government employees participating in a retirement systems on December 31,1988,
would not lose that tax exemption.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DAVIS RULING
3.

The Davis Court found that a state tax structure which exempted the retirement

income of state and local government retirees while taxing the retirement income of federal
employees violated the Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and 4U.S.C. § 111.

3

The Court offered States the choice of eliminating the preferential tax treatment for the
retirement income of its retirees, or extending the same benefits and protections to federal
retirees.
4.

The Utah Legislature responded immediately. The retirement income tax exemption

for state retirees in the Retirement Code was eliminated, and the Income Tax Code was
amended to implement a new retirement income tax structure that satisfied the U.S. Supreme
Court mandate that the tax structure not discriminate against federal retirees based on the
source of the income.
5.

First, the Governor called the Legislature into a Second Special Session in 1989 and

the Legislature passed House Bill 4, "PERSONAL RETIREMENT EXEMPTION FOR
ELDERLY." The bill contained two essential provisions, an amendment to the retirement
code, Utah Code Ann. §49-1-608, to eliminate the retirement income tax exemption for all
employees, including the group who were "grandfathered" with an income tax exemption
in 1988 under H.B. 221, and the creation of a uniform and enhanced retirement income tax
exemption for all sources of retirement related income, including not only state and federal
retirees' income, but also private employment retirement income and increased personal
exemptions upon reaching age 65. This was clearly designed to comply effectively and fully
with the Davis mandate.
6.

Secondly, in that same Special Session, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 8,

"RETIREMENT BENEFITS INCREASE," which was clearly designed to provide some
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form of replacement or substitute benefit for state and local government employees to make
up for the loss of their state retirement income tax exemption which had been taken away
byHouseBill4. Senate Bill 8 enacted Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701 and set forth the specific
eligibility requirements for state or local government retirees to qualify for a 3% increase to
their retirement allowance:
a.

The 3% adjustment would be given to all retirees covered by a system

administered by the Board who (i) were members of the system and entitled to a tax
exemption prior to 1989; and (ii) retired on or after January 1, 1989 or were already retired
on that date. The Board made no distinction between those retirees located in the State of
Utah whose retirement allowances would be subject to the tax and those who were located
out of State. In other words, the 3% increase was paid to every eligible retiree after January
1,1989. Utah Code Ann. §49-l-701(l)(3)(1989).
b.

The 3% adjustment would be added to the existing retirement base calculated

pursuant to statutory formula under the applicable retirement system pursuant to Title 49, and
would then become the new base for future increases in the retirement allowance, (which
might include, for example, the variable cost of living adjustment provided annually based
on inflation factors). The 3% adjustment then would be part of the base retirement allowance
(which has always been considered a vested right for retirees by Utah courts, and thus not
subject to future elimination or decrease by legislative or Board action). Utah Code Ann.
§49-1-701(2) (1989).

Senate Bill 8 actually included an amendment requested by
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Representative Harward to allow the 3% benefit to be increased, decreased, or even
eliminated if by July 1, 1990 the Legislature came up with a more favorable and employee
friendly tax reform package. Evidently no such plan surfaced since Representative Harward
himself sponsored the legislation less than six months later in the 1990 Annual Legislative
Session, H.B. 115 "RETIREMENT ALLOWANCE INCREASE AMENDMENTS," which
eliminated the very same provision.
c.

Each year, the Board was directed to certify to the Legislature the cost,

expressed as a percentage of salary of participating employees in the various state plans (also
called the contribution rate), necessary to fund the new 3 % adjustment to the allowance. This
funding mechanism (as had been the case historically with all retirement benefit
enhancements) would ensure that the Board would amortize the cost of this new retirement
benefit over the remaining actuarial amortization period. The benefit would then be reviewed
annually by the Board, its actuaries, and the Legislature to ensure actuarial and fiscal
soundness as required by the Retirement Code. Any resultant increases or decreases to the
contribution rate would be taken into account during salary and benefit negotiations each
year during the Annual General Session between the Legislature and state funded public
employee groups. Notably, as with other statutory retirement benefits, the Legislature did
not then, and does not today, fund the 3% adjustment by direct legislative appropriation of
tax dollars to eligible retirees. Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701(6) (1989).
d.

Two other provisions cited by the Appellants in their oral argument on the
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Motion to Dismiss were not part of the 1989 Legislation. Indeed, the provisions were not
added until five years later in the 1994 Annual General Session. See, H.B. 155 (1994). The
first provision required the Board to report the cost of the 3% adjustment separately from
the costs of the other benefits, which would remind the Legislature of its effect on the
soundness of the retirement systems.1 Utah Code Ann. § 49-l-701(6)(b).
The second provision prohibited the use of the 3% benefit enhancement in
comparative studies ofpublic employee benefits. While Plaintiffs suggested in oral argument
before Judge Nehring that the passage of this provision is proof that the Legislature did not
consider the 3% to be a true retirement benefit, the Legislature's motives were much more
practical. The Legislature passed this provision five years after the passage of the 3%
adjustment. It was never part of the original 3% benefit adjustment. This provision, by its
own language, was simply an agreed upon principle between the Legislature and public
employees that it would be unfair to use the cost of the new 3% benefit in comparative
compensation studies since the new benefit was a substantial substitute for the tax exemption,
the value of which was not used in comparative studies either.

1

It should be noted and remembered that while the cost was reported separately, it
was not funded separately. The total cost was still recognized as part of the total
employees' compensation package and not funded by separate legislative appropriations
from tax revenues produced from taxing state retirement income, which is at the core of
Plaintiffs' tax rebate argument.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After Davis was decided almost fifteen years ago, Utah, along with numerous other
states, immediately implemented the solutions approved by the Davis Court to remedy the
discriminatory tax treatment suffered by Appellants' class. In Utah, as in most other states,
the solution involved the repeal of the state and local retirees' retirement income exemption.
In some states, including Utah, Oregon, Montana and Virginia, the Legislature also granted
increased retirement benefits to state and local government employees to make up for, or
offset, in some measure, the impact caused by the loss of the income tax exemption. While
Appellants weave an interesting yam comparing these benefit enhancements to illegal tax
rebates, the plain and simple facts of this case, as well as the holdings of the courts in our
sister states on this issue, will lead this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the
Legislature engaged in an appropriate exercise of its legislative power in providing a
substantial substitute to its employees to replace the loss of a tax exemption while at the same
time honoring the Davis Court mandate to provide equal tax treatment.
Because Appellants cannot seriously argue that the Legislature cannot grant increased
retirement benefits to its public servants, Appellants are reduced to a creative, albeit
misguided, attempt to recast the benefit enhancement as a direct dollar-for-dollar offset, i.e.,
a tax rebate, or close thereto, of state retirees' tax liability. Such an argument would be
persuasive if it were true but the undisputed facts on the record plainly reveal a much less
sinister legislative design.
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First and foremost, the benefit enhancement bears no relationship to the tax structure
in Utah. Utah's income tax rate is 7% - the benefit increase is 3%. Second, the benefit
enhancement is paid to all eligible retirees, not just those residing in Utah. Third, the benefit
is funded by actuarially set contribution rates and funded by retirement fund monies, not by
separate legislative appropriation based on retirees' increased tax obligations. Finally, and
most persuasively, this Court should uphold the benefit increase because the Davis Court
expressly recognized the right of each state to provide such a benefit increase to its retirees
to make up for the loss of their retirement income exemption.

ARGUMENT I
THE ENACTMENT OF A 3% INCREASE TO STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME TO SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE LOSS OF A RETIREMENT INCOME TAX EXEMPTION DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY TAX
TREATMENT UNDER DAVIS V. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY.
A.

Davis Supports the Proposition that States May Increase State and Local
Government Employee Compensation and Benefits to Compensate for the
Loss of the Income Tax Exemption.

Appellants erroneously argue that Davis precludes any legislative enactment of
compensation or retirement benefit enhancements to offset state retirees' loss of their
retirement income tax exemption. Appellant's Brief at 16,17. In support of this proposition,
they cite the Davis Court's statement that future discrimination against federal retirees could
be avoided:
9

. . .either by extending the tax exemption to retired federal
employees (or to all retired employees), or by eliminating the
exemption for retired state and local government employees.
Davis, 489 U.S. at 818.
Utah, as well as the vast majority of states affected by the Davis ruling, fully complied
with the Supreme Court mandate by eliminating the retirement income tax exemption for
retired state and local government employees. The retirement income tax structure in Utah
is now the same for federal and state employees. Appellants would now have this Court
expand the Supreme Court's directive with respect to the tax exemption to include an
outright prohibition against any increases in compensation or benefits for state and local
government employees which "may be related" to the loss of the retirement income tax
exemption. And Appellants argue that such an interpretation is warranted because the
creation of the 3% benefit enhancement for state and local government employees was an
"unsanctioned third option" in violation of the Court's own proffered remedies. Appellants'
Brief at 16.
Not only is this interpretation unwarranted, but it is also inconsistent with Davis itself.
Both the majority and minority opinions in Davis discussed openly the possibility that states
might actually increase either their employee compensation or retirement benefits to
compensate their retirees for the loss of their tax exemption.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, advocated for state rights in these matters:
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. . .The state may always compensate in pay or salary for what
it assesses in taxes . . . It trivializes the Supremacy Clause to
interpret it as prohibiting the States from providing through this
limited tax exemption what the state has an unquestionable right
to provide through increased retirement benefits.
Davis. 489 U.S. at 824.
The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, picked up on the minority opinion discussion
regarding the states' ability to offset the net effect of the Davis decision by increasing
compensation or benefits:
In order to provide the same after-tax benefits to all retired state
employees by means of increased salaries or benefit payments
instead of a tax exemption, the State would have to increase its
outlays by more than the cost of the current exemption, since the
increased payments to retirees would result in higher federal
income tax payments in some circumstances. This fact serves to
illustrate the impact on the Federal government of the State's
discriminatory tax exemption for state retirees. Taxes enacted to
reduce the State's employment costs at the expense of the
federal treasury are the type of discriminatory legislation that the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is intended to bar.
IdL, at 2, citing 489 U.S. at 815 n. 4.
Utah addressed the concerns expressed by the majority specifically by the elimination
of the tax exemption for state retirement income (where the exemption served to reduce the
state's employment costs at the expense of the federal treasury), and by the enactment of a
3% benefit enhancement (which serves to increase both state employee costs to Utah
government and federal income tax receipts at the federal treasury). Combined, these two
actions ensure that the purposes of intergovernmental tax immunity are not undermined while
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permitting the states' reasonable latitude in responding to the Davis directives and its
commitments to its own employees. Judge Nehring understood this principal in his order
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss:
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar challenges
to legislative responses to Davis (citing cases).. .
Irrespective of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis
Court did not foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability
to respond to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its
retirees.
Record, at 349.
This Court should affirm Judge Nehring's Order and dismiss this claim.

B.

The 3% Increase in Retirement Benefits to State and Local Government
Employees is Not a Tax Rebate.

Utah was not alone in fashioning a legislative remedy to Davis which federal retirees
found offensive. Four other state Supreme Court decisions in three states have ruled on the
merits of retirement benefit enhancements enacted in direct response to Davis.
Two of these decisions came from the Oregon Supreme Court and were a result of two
distinct and separate legislative attempts to provide increased benefits to state and local
government employees to compensate, in some measure, for the loss of their retirement
income exemption pursuant to Davis.

Read together, these two cases, Ragsdale v.

Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Or. 1995) and Vogl v. Department of Revenue, 960
P.2d 373 (Or. 1998), provide an informative and authorative discussion of the struggles
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experienced by State Legislatures as they attempted to implement the Davis mandate while
simultaneously keeping contractual and other commitments to valued state workers. Even
more importantly, these cases provide valuable assistance to this Court in probing the
circumstances pursuant to which a legitimate retirement benefit increase could become an
illegal tax rebate.
In Ragsdale, the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed Oregon's initial response to Davis.
As in Utah, Oregon repealed the tax exemption granted to Oregon state employees. The
relevant tax code section was also amended to eliminate a provision excluding Oregon state
retirement benefits from taxation, thus providing the non-discriminatory tax structure
mandated by Davis. Oregon Laws 1991, Chapter 823, sections 1 and 3. At the same time,
the Oregon Legislature also increased retirement benefits for state employees. Oregon Laws
1991, Chapter 796. The Oregon replacement benefit was based on employees' years of
service in the retirement system and ranged from 1% for employees with 10-20 years of
service to 4% for employees with 30 or more years of service.
As in Utah, the Oregon Retirement Fund was responsible for providing the funding
mechanism for the benefit. The Oregon Legislature made no direct legislative appropriation
for distribution to state retirees. Oregon also prohibited the retirement system from paying
increased benefits in any year in which the retirement benefits were exempt from the Oregon
income tax. And, as in Utah, federal retirees living in Oregon claimed that the replacement
retirement benefit was an illegal tax rebate. Under this set of facts, virtually identical to
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those before this Court, the Ragsdale Court rejected the federal retiree claims that the
benefit enhancement was a tax rebate and upheld the retirement benefit enhancement.
Four years after the Oregon Supreme Court had rejected the federal retirees' tax
rebate claims, the Oregon Legislature crafted another benefit enhancement for its state
retirees. This time, and unlike the earlier flat percentage increases to the retirement benefit,
the 1995 legislation established a complex formula which effectively calculated the amount
of state retiree income which would be lost to state taxes and then increased the retiree's
benefit by that same amount. The formula quoted and paralleled the maximum state income
tax rate and allowed the retirement benefit increase to fluctuate with that rate. The statute
expressly provided that no rights, contractual or otherwise, were granted to retirees by reason
of the increase in benefits. The Legislature then expressly declared that the new benefit
increase was payment and compensation for damages suffered by retirees as a result of the
taxation of their retirement benefits. Oregon Laws 1995, Chapter 569. This time the Oregon
Supreme Court held that:
Clearly, as the state moves closer to replacing the lost net
income on a dollar-for dollar basis , the fact that the increase is
in fact a tax rebate, rather than a general increase in
compensation to "make up" for lost income, becomes more
apparent.
VogL,960P.2dat380.
The Court was equally clear in its conclusions that this holding was confined to the
1995 statutory scheme and that neither Ragsdale nor its analysis of the 1991 statutory scheme
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was overruled.
Appellants' cite Vogl as support for their proposition that the 3 % benefit enhancement
is a tax rebate. But nowhere in Utah's statutory 3% retirement enhancement provisions is
there even any mention of a relationship with the Utah income tax structure, let alone any
dollar-for-dollar replacement formula. Appellants' reliance on Vogl is misplaced and must
fail.
The Montana Legislature's response to Davis was also similar in some respects to
Utah's response. Montana eliminated the state retirement income exemption and enacted a
2.5% benefit increase for its retirees. However, two new factors surfaced that were critical
in the Montana Supreme Court's analysis of Montana's benefit increase. First, unlike Utah,
only retirees living in Montana would receive the increase. Second, also unlike Utah, the
cost of the benefit enhancement was not funded by retirement investment income and
employer and employee contributions, but by direct legislative appropriations out of the
office of the Montana State Treasurer.
In Sheehv v. Public employees Retirement Division, 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993), the
Montana Supreme Court sided with the federal retirees and declared the benefit to be a
discriminatory tax. However, contrary to Appellants' assertions, Sheehv was not decided in
favor of the federal retirees because the replacement benefit and the tax exemption which it
replaced were somehow "related," or that there was some dollar for dollar replacement. The
Montana Court ruled in the federal retirees' favor because that Court could not find any
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evidence of a legitimate retirement benefit. These two factors, which the Court found to be
the compelling evidence in that determination, are notably absent in Utah's case. The Sheehy
Court even offered its assistance in determining what the benefit should have looked like to
pass muster:
If it were a pension benefit, the State would have provided it to
all of its retirees in recognition of their years of public service
rather then just those living in Montana....
Further evidence that the adjustment is not an actual increased
retirement benefit for retired state employees is the fact that the
funding of the section 5 adjustment bears no resemblance to the
funding of actual state retirement benefit adjustments previously
enacted by the Legislature... Here the funding for the so-called
retirement adjustment payment is statutorily appropriated from
the general fund pursuant to section 4 of chapter 823-that is,
from the taxes collected from all Montana taxpayers. The money
to pay the adjustment never goes into the state retirement funds,
but is simply paid by the state treasurer to the retirement boards,
to be distributed by the boards in accordance with the provisions
of chapter 823.
Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 768.
This Court must contrast Montana's benefit with Utah's benefit. The record is clear
that the determinable factors in Montana are absent in Utah's benefit enhancement. First, in
Utah, all eligible employees, regardless of their state of domicile, receive the benefit. Second,
the funding for Utah's benefit enhancement is actuarially determined, made up of employer
contributions, employee contributions, and investment returns and is part of the employees'
compensation package. Third, the benefit itself is paid out of the retirement funds, not by
separate and direct legislative appropriation.
16

Most persuasively, the final state court decision rendered on this issue was decided
in Virginia. Virginia's response to Davis involved both a direct legislative appropriation to
retirees ($15.75 million) and a 3% adjustment to state retirees' benefits. Virginia also
repealed the state employees retirement income exemption.
The Virginia court's analysis is noteworthy inasmuch as the tax rebate argument was
considered in light of the assumption that Plaintiffs' factual allegations about the nature of
the payments (identical to those presented by Appellants' here) were all true. In finding
against the federal retirees on all counts and upholding both the appropriation and the benefit
adjustment, the Circuit Court of Virginia noted that the Davis Court had expressly
recognized, and was not offended by, the fact that a state's response to the Davis decision
might be to give extra money to state retirees to make up for the money those retirees lost as
a result of taxation. Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000),
cert, refused, No.010270, Va. (April 20, 2001), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 202 (mem) (Oct. 1,
2001). Notably absent from its analysis was any discussion of the reasoning applied by the
Ragsdale, Vogl and Sheehy Courts. For Virginia, the clear and unequivocable language of
the United States Supreme Court in Davis was dispositive. So should it be here. The fact
that the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case is consistent with its Davis
decision philosophy that the states should be allowed to fashion their own remedies.
There is a common thread that appears throughout the Oregon, Montana and Virginia
court holdings. Underlying each court's analysis was an understanding that a retirement benefit

17

enhancement does not become an illegal tax rebate because it is "related" to the Davis
decision. Nor does it become an illegal tax rebate because a Legislature may have intended
that the retirement benefit enhancement replace in some measure the loss of a retirement
income tax exemption for state and local government employees. Judge Nehring clearly
understood that analysis. Appellants evidently do not inasmuch as they still appear to be
laboring under the mistaken belief that "the pension increase is clearly and expressly part of
Utah's tax code." Appellant's Brief at 23, n. 5.

ARGUMENT II

THE 3% RETIREMENT BENEFIT ENHANCEMENT SERVES AS A
SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOSS OF THE RETIREMENT
INCOME EXEMPTION AND AS SUCH CANNOT BE AN ILLEGAL TAX
REBATE,
There is no argument between Appellants and the Board that the 3% benefit
enhancement was intended to be, and is in fact, a "vested right." Appellee's Brief, at 27. As
such, it is entitled to the same protection that this Court has granted continuously over the
past half century to pension contract rights. This Court has created a doctrine, well known
to all branches of government and beneficiaries of the retirement system, that no retirement
benefit that has vested can be taken away or diminished by legislative or Board action unless
a "substantial substitute" is provided as a replacement for the loss of the "vested right."2
2

In fact, Appellants appear to have no reservation in declaring that the Legislature
breached its contract with retirees, Appellants' Brief at 27, n.8., an allegation the Board certainly
denies. Given that State and local government retirees have not pursued a claim for fourteen
18

In the earliest of this Court's decisions on point, Newcomb v. Ogden City Public
School Teachers' Retirement Commission, 243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952), the Court traced the
history and differing states' theories of vested rights and concluded that in Utah,

'\ . .

the Legislature may not provide for the termination of a retirement system unless a
substantial substitute is provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained by pensioners
or annuitants . . . . " Driggs v. Utah Teachers' Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943)
declared that the retirement allowance of a retired teacher could not be reduced after
retirement. In recent cases the Court has reiterated these long standing principles, and
expanded its application to all those circumstances where a person has accepted an offer of
the state or one of its agencies, and has met all the conditions prerequisite to receiving a
benefit. In such cases the state is bound to perform on its contractual agreements the same
as a private person must perform. See, Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d
93, 95 (Utah 1988).
With respect to retirees the rule of law is clear. There can be no legislative reduction
or elimination of vested contractual pension rights where a person has met all the conditions
precedent for receiving the pension unless a substantial substitute is granted in place of the
reduction or elimination of benefits. Because the Legislature explicitly made the 3%
adjustment part of the base benefit and because that base retirement cannot be diminished or

years after the creation of the "replacement benefit" testifies that the replacement benefit itself is
indeed a substantial substitute for the loss of the tax exemption and consistent with this Court's
protection of retirees' vested rights.
19

eliminated by subsequent legislative enactments, the 3% benefit must be a vested right.
Even Appellants' own lead case, Vogl, noted the difference between a contractual
vested right and a legitimate compensation increase:
. . . If the increase was, in fact, part of PERS employees'
compensation, we would expect those employees to obtain a
vested right to it.
Vogl, 960 P.2d at 380.
While Oregon's benefit expressly provided that there was no contractual right to the
benefit, Utah's retirees do have a vested right to the benefit enhancement. See, supra at 8-10.

CONCLUSION
There is no support in Utah Code Ann. §49-1-701 (1998) for Plaintiffs' theory that
the benefit is a tax rebate. In this case, what that law does not say is as important as what it
does say and speaks volumes. Namely, there is no attempt to coordinate the 3% benefit with
the income tax rates or structure under the tax code. There is no direct legislative
appropriation to retirees to pay for this benefit enhancement. Indeed, there is no long-term
balancing of tax receipts with retirement costs which would one expect if the Legislature was
rebating the tax collected to the retirees through the 3% adjustment. Moreover, such a
correlation would be impossible, since the taxation of state employees retirement income is
now, pursuant to Davis, of infinite duration, while the 3% adjustment has a limited life span,
ending upon the death of the last retiree eligible to receive the benefit under Utah Code Ann.
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§49-1-701(1998). And finally, there is no correlation between the 3% adjustment and the
State's effective income tax rate of 7%. It is painfully obvious to the highly compensated
state retiree, if such a retiree can indeed be found to exist, that the 3% adjustment is in no
way an adequate replacement for the loss of the tax exemption. At the same time, at the
opposite end of the financial spectrum, the meager pensions of the state's earliest retirees
would not be taxable under the new tax structure anyway, since the first $4,800 of retirement
income is exempt (or a $7,500 personal exemption upon reaching age 65). For this group,
the 3% adjustment is a tax free bonus payment. In neither of these examples, nor in the cases
of the tens of thousands of other retirees receiving the 3% adjustment, does the benefit itself
replace dollar-for-dollar the loss of the tax exemption, nor was it designed to accomplish that
improbable feat.
In truth, faced with the task of strict adherence to the Davis doctrine, while honoring
its commitment to its employees, the Legislature acted appropriately in repealing the
offensive tax exemption and simultaneously honoring its long standing commitments to
retirees by making up for the loss of the exemption with a benefit enhancement which has
no correlation with the tax code, and which the Davis Court anticipated and approved.
Having considered all of these facts in favor of Appellants, this Court is left with the
inescapable conclusion that the 3 % replacement benefit enhancement is not related to or part
of the state tax structure, is consistent with actions taken and upheld in other states, and is
consistent with and expressly authorized by Davis.
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For these reasons, Respondent respectfully requests this Court to uphold Judge
(Justice) Nehring' s Order dismissing this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this'Zi day of November, 2003.

By:.

I
Kevin A. Howard
Gregory D. Phillips
Daniel D. Andersen
Attorney for the Appellee,
Utah State Retirement Board
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ADDENDA
Addendum "A"

Minute Entry, Third Judicial District Court, Case No.
010911230, entered on April, 4,2003

Addendum "B"

Order of Dismissal, Third Judicial District Court, Case No.
010911230, entered on May 13,2003.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

By

~~^?
/)
,.,

J—P

RICHARD C. THOMPSON et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 010 91123 0

vs.

JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, et.
ax» /
Defendants.

This matter is before me on defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the
plaintiffs1

complaint.

For the reasons

stated below, I grant

defendants' motion.
On

September

19,

1989,

the

Utah

legislature

made

state

retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable,
while

at

the

same

retirees by 3%.

time

increasing

pension

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701

benefits

(1998) .

to

state

Plaintiffs,

retirees who were employed by the federal government, challenge the
state's decision to increase pension benefits to state retirees,
claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement for the lost
tax exemption and essentially

constitute

tax rebates to State

retirees.
A

full understanding

requires

a historical

of the nature of plaintiffs1

explanation.

Prior

to 1989, 21

claims
state

exempted recipients of state retirement benefits from income tax
while imposing income tax on the benefits of federal retirees.

In

1989, the United States Supreme Court ended this practice, finding

rb°i
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that it constituted unlawful tax discrimination in violation of
federal law and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
Davis v Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
Utah, like many sister states, responded to the Supreme
Court! s edict by amending its statute to make state retirement
benefits taxable. The legislature also increased pension benefits
to state retirees by 3%. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).

It is

undisputed that the increase in retirement benefits largely offsets
the amount of income tax which an individual Utah retiree would be
required to pay.
Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where

federal

retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits
because of the rebate.
I

have

reviewed

the

reported

cases

addressing

challenges to legislative responses to Davis.

See,

similar
Sheehy v

Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 785
(Mont. 1993), Ragsdale v Department of Revenue, 895 P. 2d 1348
(1995), Voal v Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or. 1997),
Almeter v Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000)
cert denied.

Irrespective of outcome, these cases recognize that
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the Davis court did not foreclose; and in fact anticipated, a
state ls

ability to respond to the court's holding by increasing

benefits to its retirees.

Those cases which invalidated, as

violative of Davis, increases in state retiree benefits, did so
only

because

the

benefit

increases

incorporated

additional

provisions which made transparent the true and improper nature of
the response

creating a tax rebate.

Specifically, in Sheehy the Montana Supreme Court concluded
that Montanars response to Davis was actually a

discriminatory

partial tax rebate that improperly favored state retirees "living
in Montana based solely on the source of their retirement income.
864 P.2d 762, 768 (1993) . Further evidence of a tax rebate was the
fact that Montana l s funding for the adjustment was statutorily
appropriated from the general fund and not funded by investment
income produced by the retirement fund itself.

Id. at 768.

Similarly, in Voal it was determined that Oregon! s 1995
statutory

increase to the Public Employees Retirement

System

("PERS") benefits to compensate for "injuries" arising out of the
taxation of the PERS benefits was in violation of Davis. 960 P. 2d
373 (1997) . The Vogl Court ultimately concluded that the increase
in PERS benefits was a tax rebate because the relationship between
the lost exemption and the 1995 increase was one of "purported
legal equivalence."

Id. at 381.
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Upon consideration of these cases, I conclude that Utah's
statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of the above
mentioned provisions from which one could reasonably conclude that
the benefit increase was, in fact, a tax rebate.
It would be disingenuous for me to suggest that the timing and
content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann. , Section 49-1-701
(1998), did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish b y
lawful

means

impermissibly

the result

which

discriminatory.

the Davis
The timing

court

found' to be

and intent

of the

legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling.

Of

primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product
of the legislature's response to Davis. The statute itself applies
to all members whose retirement allowance was previously exempt
from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has "subsequently become
subject to that tax."

Specifically, a member shall receive:

(a) the administrator shall calculate the member's retirement
allowance pursuant to the formula governing the system
from which the member retired;
(b) the administrator shall then increase the allowance
calculated under Subsection (2) (a) by 3%; and;
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection (2) (b)
is the new basis upon which any future adjustments to
benefits are made
UCA § 49-11-701 (2002) \
Additionally, under subsection (6) ,
]

The 2 002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered
this section, formerly referred to as § 49-1-701.
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(a)

[t]he retirement board shall annually certify the
contribution rate necessary for each system to comply
with this section and may adopt rules to administer this
section.
(b) [t]his contribution rate shall be reported separately from
the total contribution rate necessary to fund the systems
on an actuarially sound basis and may not be used in
comparative studies of public employee benefits.

UCA § 49-11-701 (2002) .
A close look at these statutory provisions indicates 'that the
language

betrays

no

discriminatory

content.

First,

the

3%

adjustment is given to all retirees who were members of the system.
There is no distinction between retirees located in the state of
Utah and those located out of state.

Essentially, every eligible

retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989 received the 3%
increase. UCA § 49-1-701(1)(3)(1998). Second, the statute itself
evidences no attempt to coordinate the 3% benefit with the income
tax rates or structure as found under Utah Code Ann, Title 59.
Finally, distinguishing itself

from Sheehv, the plain language

shows that the legislature does not fund the 3% adjustment via
direct

legislative

retirees.

UCA

appropriation

§ 49-1-701 (G).

of

tax

dollars

to

eligible

Ultimately, the total cost is

recognized as a direct part of the total employees' compensation
package•
This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis court's clear
anticipation

of

the

Utah

legislature's

response,

through

its

:

^
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holding, warrants the conclusion that plaintiffs1 claim must fail
as a matter of law and defendant's motion is hereby granted.
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other arguments
advance by defendant in aid of its motion.
Defendant's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry,

Dated this /£*>*

day of April, 2003.

"XMM

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this Jl
2003

Gary Dodge
Kevin W. Bates
Mark R. Clements
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Kevin A. Howard
Attorney for Defendant Utah State Retirement Board
560 E 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
John C. McCarrey
Timothy A. Bodily
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorney for Defendants
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor

PO Box 140874
S a l t Lake City, Utah^£iU4-0874
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JOHN C. McCARREY #5755
TIMOTHY A. BODILY #64 96
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4 666
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
Utah State Tax Commission
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874
Telephone: (801)366-0375

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
RICHARD C. THOMPSON et. al.,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010911230

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
et. al.,

Judge Ronald E. Nehring

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on
August 20, 2002, pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss of the Utah
State Tax Commission Defendants.

On August 23, 2002, the Court

entered an Order joining the State Retirement Board.

Subsequent

to that order, Plaintiffs, Tax Commission Defendants, and the
State Retirement Board agreed on a schedule and filed memoranda
to supplement the Motion to Dismiss that was heard on August 23,

2002.

Plaintiffs were represented by Gary Dodge, Kevin W. Bates,

and Mark R. Clements of the law firm of Hatch, James and Dodge.
The Tax Commission was represented by John C. McCarrey and
Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Attorneys General.

The Utah State

Retirement Board was represented by Kevin A. Howard, Gregory D.
Phillips, Daniel D. Andersen, and David B. Hansen of the law firm
Howard, Phillips and Andersen.
The State Retirement Board joined in the pending Motion to
Dismiss.

After reviewing the supplemental pleadings, the Court

concluded that the oral argument held on August 20, 2002, was
sufficient and that further oral argument would not aid the Court
in its decisionHaving reviewed the pleadings of the parties submitted prior
to the hearing, and having reviewed the subsequent pleadings
filed by Plaintiffs, the Tax Commission Defendants, and the Utah
State Retirement Board, this case is dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(B)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons

stated below, I grant Defendants' motion.
On September 19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state
retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable,
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state

2

retirees by 3%.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998).

Plaintiffs,

retirees who were employed by the federal government, challenge
the state' s decision to increase pension benefits to state
retirees, claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement for
the lost tax exemption and essentially constitute tax rebates to
State retirees.
A full understanding of the nature of Plaintiffs' claims
requires an historical explanation.

Prior to 1989, 21 states

exempted recipients of state retirement benefits from income tax
while imposing income tax on the benefits of federal retirees.
In 198 9, the Unites State Supreme Court ended this practice,
finding that it constituted unlawful tax discrimination in
violation of federal law and the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity.

Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).

Utah, like many sister states, responded to the Supreme
Court's edict by amending its statute to make state retirement
benefits taxable.

The legislature also increased pension

benefits to state retirees by 3%.
(1998) .

Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-7 01

It is undisputed that the increase in retirement

benefits largely offsets the amount of income tax which an
individual Utah retiree would be required to pay.

3

Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where federal
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits
because of the rebate.
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar
challenges to legislative responses to Davis.

See, S'heehv v.

Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 786
(Mont. 1993), Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348
(Or. 1995), Voal v. Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or.
1997), Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir.
429 (2000) cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 202 (Mem.) (2001).

Irrespective

of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis Court did not
foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond
to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its-retirees.
Those cases which invalidated, as violative of Davis, increases
in state retiree benefits, did so only because the benefit
increases incorporated additional provisions which made
transparent the true and improper nature of the response—
creating a tax rebate.

4

Specifically, in Sheehy the Montana Supreme Court concluded
that Montana's response to Davis was actually a discriminatory
partial tax rebate that improperly favored state retirees ^living
in Montana based solely on the source of their retirement
income."

Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 768 (1993).

Further evidence of a

tax rebate wa£ the fact that Montana's funding for the adjustment
was statutorily appropriated from the general fund and not funded
by investment income produced by the retirement fund Itself.

Id.

Similarly, in Vogl, it was determined that Oregon's 1995
statutory increase to the Public Employees Retirement System
("PERS") benefits to compensate for "injuries" arising out of the
taxation of the PERS benefits was in violation of Davis.
960 P.2d 373 (1997).

Vogl,

The Vogl court ultimately concluded that

the increase in PERS benefits was a tax rebate because the
relationship between the lost exemption and the 1995 increase was
one of "purported legal equivalence."

Id. at 381.

Upon consideration of these cases, I conclude that Utah's
statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of the above
mentioned provisions from which one could reasonably conclude
that the benefit increase was, in fact, a tax rebate.
It would be disingenuous for me to suggest that the timing

5

and content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann.

§ 4 9-1-7 01

(1998) , did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by
lawful means the result which the Davis Court found to be
impermissibly discriminatory.

The timing and intent of the

legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling.

Of

primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product
of the legislature's response to Davis.

The statute itself

applies to all members whose retirement allowance was previously
exempt from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has ^subsequently
become subject to the tax."

Specifically, a member shall

receive:
(a)

(b)

(c)

the administrator shall calculate the member's
retirement allowance pursuant to the formula
governing the system from which the member
retired;
the administrator shall then increase the
allowance calculated under Subsection (2)(a) by
3%; and
the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection
(2)(b) is the new basis upon which any future
adjustments to benefits are made.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002)l.
Additionally, under subsection (6)
(a)

[t]he retirement board shall annually certify the

1

The 2002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered
this section, formerly referred to as Section 49-1-701.
6

(b)

contribution rate necessary for each system to
comply with this section and may adopt rules ro
administer this section,
[t]his contribution rate shall be reported
separately from the total contribution rate
necessary to fund the systems on an actuarially
sound basis and may not be used in comparative
studies of public employee benefits.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002).
A close look at these statutory provisions indicates that
the language betrays no discriminatory content.

First, the 3%

adjustment is given to all retirees who were members of the
system.

There is no distinction between retirees located in the

state of Utah and those located out of state.

Essentially, every

eligible retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989,
received the 3% increase.^ Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1) (3)
(1998).

Second, the>, statute itself evidences no attempt-to

coordinate the 3% benefit with the income tax rates or structure
as found under Utah Code Ann., Title 59.

Finally, distinguishing

itself from Sheehy, the plain language shows that the legislature
does not fund the 3% adjustment via direct legislative
appropriation of tax dollars to eligible retirees.
Ann. § 49-1-701(6) (1998).

Utah Code

Ultimately, the total cost is

recognized as a direct part of the total employeesr compensation
package.
7

This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis Court's
clear anticipation of the Utah legislature's response, through
its holding, warrants the conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims must
fail as a matter of law, and Defendants' motion is hereby
granted.
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other
arguments advanced by Defendants in aid of their motion.

DATED this

l^>

day of

(fy\

2003,

RONAL
Distri
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Hatch, James & Dodge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Howard, Phillips & Andersen
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement
Board
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